Use of Scientific Method in Geography | Scientific Method | Geography

In this article we will discuss about:- 1. Meaning of Scientific Method 2. Key Elements of Scientific Method 3. Routes to Explanation 4. Elements 5. Geographical Application.

Meaning of Scientific Method:

The term ‘scientific method’ denotes the logical structure of the process by which the search for trustworthy knowledge advances. The primary task of scientific method is to explain empirical phenomena. There is no need to argue that geography ought to be a science.

Geography simply is a science by virtue of the fact that it is a truth- seeking discipline whose raw materials consist of empirical observations. There is no suggestion that geography should undergo any sort of epistemological restructuring.

Hay identifies four categories or groups of geographers with regard to the appropriateness or inappropriateness of scientific method in geography. The first group consists mainly of physical geographers who believe that their discipline is a field of a natural science and, therefore, do not doubt that scientific method is appropriate.

In the second group are those human geographers, who see scientific methods as being appropriate to their discipline as social science, although they may also recognise that such an application poses certain problems not encountered in classical natural sciences like physics and chemistry.

The third group consists of those who believe that the subject matter of geography makes scientific or quasi-scientific methodology inappropriate. Most recently, a fourth group has emerged which seeks to apply Marxist methods in geography and believes that such methods are scientific not in the mould of classical natural sciences.

In order to understand these differing views, it is necessary to identify the key elements of scientific thinking and practice, to outline some of the philosophical problems involved in scientific method not always evident to scientists themselves, as well as to examine some additional issues which arise when scientific method is applied to geography and also to similar disciplines.

Key Elements of Scientific Method:

The scientific method is often characterised by five elements – theory (and fact), law, logic and reduction, which necessarily sustain the scientific thinking and/or approach. However, there is one more element, i.e. ‘hypothesis’ that also sustains and provides the required input to scientific practice and process in geography, and also in related sciences.

1. Theory and Fact:

Basic to modern science is an intricate relation between theory and fact. Popular opinion generally conceives of these as direct opposites. Theory is compared with speculation and thus a theory remains speculation until it is proved. When this proof is made, theory becomes fact. Facts are thought to be definite, certain, without question and their meaning to be self-evident. Theory (speculation) is supposed to be the realm of philosophers.

Scientific theory, therefore, is thought to be merely the summation of facts which have been accumulated upon a given discipline and/ or subject.

It is, indeed, a fact that:

(1) Theory and fact are not diametrically opposed, but inextricably intertwined;

(2) Theory is not speculation; and

(3) Scientists are very much concerned with both theory and fact.

A fact is regarded as an empirically variable observation. It could never have produced modern science had it not been gathered. Theory refers to the relationship between facts, or to the ordering them in some meaningful way.

It also refers to an organised and coherent body of assumptions and arguments. It may be directed to the explanation of a unique phenomenon (Wegner’s theory of continental drift had only one world to consider) or a whole class of phenomena (the theory of air masses).

Theories may be used to account for different phenomena. Without theory, science could yield no prediction. Without prediction there would be no control over the material world.

It can, therefore, be said that the facts of science are the product of observations that are not random but meaningful, i.e. theoretically relevant. Thus, facts and theory are interrelated/ intertwined in many complex ways. The development of science can be considered as a constant interplay between theory and fact.

Theory is a tool of science in five ways:

(1) It defines the major orientation of a science, by defining the kinds of data which are to be abstracted;

(2) It offers a conceptual scheme by which the relevant phenomena are systematised, classified and interrelated; it summarises facts into (a) empirical generalisations and (b) systems of generalisations;

(4) It predicts facts; and

(5) It points to gaps in our knowledge.

However, facts are also productive of theory in five ways:

(1) They help to initiate theories;

(2) They lead to the reformulation of existing theory;

(3) They cause the rejection of theories which do not fit the facts;

(4) They change the focus and orientation of theory; and

(5) They classify and redefine theory.

Scientific Theory:

‘A scientific theory may be considered as a set of sentences expressed in terms of a specific vocabulary.

The vocabulary may contain primitive terms which cannot be defined and ‘defend’ terms which may be formed from the primitive terms. The sentences may similarly be divided into primitive sentences— axiomatic statements—and derivative sentences— theorems… terms such as ‘point’, ‘line’, ‘place’ form the primitive terms collected together in an initial set of axiomatic statements…. In addition to the primitive term and the axiomatic statements, scientific theories also possess certain rules which govern the formation of the derivative sentences – But a theory is useful in empirical science only if it is given some interpretation with reference to empirical phenomena….The text of the theory provides a translation from the completely abstract theoretical language to the language of empirical observation…. The text of a theory not only identifies the empirical subject-matter which the theory refers to. It also identifies the domain of the theory… (that) may be regarded the section or sections of reality which the theory adequately covers’.

Harvey (1969, 90-91) identifies the following advantages of a formal statement of a theory:

1. ‘The formal statement of a theory requires the elimination of inexactness and, as a consequence of this, ensures complete certainty as to the logical validity of the conclusion. The empirical success of a theory relies entirely upon the success of the text in linking the abstract symbols of the theory to real world events’.

2. ‘The elaboration of formal theory, provided the basic postulates are good ones, can help suggest new ideas, prove unsuspected conclusions, and indicate new empirical laws.’

3. ‘The formal statement of a theory requires turning a spatial or temporal sequence into a completely non-spatial and non-temporal set of relations. Even in theories which explicitly include time or space as variables the treatment is abstracted….It is ‘therefore’ characteristic of formal theory to state all propositions—whether primitive or derived— as if they were universal propositions. Again, it is the text which has to perform the difficult task of linking these universal propositions to empirical events which have a location in space and time.’

It appears from the above points that the key problems in the application of formal theory in the empirical sciences is the provision of an adequate text.

The text associated with a formal theory necessarily performs two essential tasks:

(i) It identifies an abstract symbol with a particular class of real-world phenomena, and

(ii) It may place the abstract symbols within a particular context which may include specific mention of location in space and time.

The text associated with a formal theory should not only link abstract symbols with abstract concepts. It should also specify how abstract concepts may be reduced to factual statements. This, therefore, raises the whole problem of the nature of concept-formation in the sciences and the operational problem of giving idealisation and theoretical concepts some adequate definition.

There are innumerable idealisations to be found in both the natural and social sciences. Indeed, explanation would be impracticable without such idealisations.

Some idealisations can be theoretically defined, and they are characteristic of the natural sciences where physics, in particular, has achieved a high degree of unification in its theoretical structure. However, many idealisations in both the natural and social sciences cannot be referred to any well-established theoretical structure, either because the idealisation is itself inappropriate, or because the requisite general theory is yet to be established. Idealisations in social sciences are fundamentally different from the theoretical concepts of natural sciences.

The reasons – the text is deficient and/or weak, and the domain not clearly defined. The failure to achieve significant explanatory power in social sciences is the result of the paucity in such disciplines of the requisite general theory.

The universality of the theoretical statements may be transferred to any situation in space and time since it appears that the statements are universal in fact. In the social sciences this is not so, and therefore one of the important functions of the text of a theory is to identify the domain of objects and events to which such theories can be applied—this domain may simply be defined by a set of spatial and temporal coordinates. A theory without a text and a well-defined domain is useless for prediction.

However, the greater success of the physical sciences, relative to the social sciences, in providing a text for theoretical structures accounts for the greater predictive success of the natural, as opposed to the social, sciences.

A scientific theory, however, needs to be tested or assessed not only for its own internal consistency, but also for its consistency with the world as observed.

The Role of Fact:

Theory and fact are in constant interaction. Developments in one may lead to developments in the other. Theory, implicit or explicit, is basic to knowledge and even perception. Theory is not merely a passive element. It plays an active role in the uncovering of facts. Similarly, fact has an equally significant part to play in the development of theory. Science actually depends upon a continuous stimulation of fact by theory and of theory by fact.

a. Fact initiates theory:

Many of the human- interest stories in the history of science describe how a striking fact, sometimes stumbled upon, led to important new theories. This is what the public thinks of as a ‘discovery’. Many of the stories take an added drama in the retelling, but they express a fundamental fact in the growth of science, that an apparently simple observation may lead to significant theory.

Merton (1949) has called this kind of observation ‘the unanticipated, anamolous and strategic datum’. Attempting to account for the anomalous datum, however appeared to have led to an interesting development of theory.

Almost every ‘discoverer’ was preceded by others who saw his discovery first and thought no further about it. This was the case with most of those who attempted for the unanticipated, anomalous, and strategic datum for the development of theory. The fact initiates theory only if the scientist/researcher is alert to the possible interplay between the two.

b. Facts lead to the rejection and reformulation of existing theory:

Facts do not completely determine theory, since many possible theories can be developed to take account of a specific set of observations. Nevertheless, facts are the stubborn of the two. Any theory must adjust to the facts and is rejected or reformulated if they cannot be fitted into its structure.

Since research is a continuing activity, rejection and reformulation are likely to be going on simultaneously. Observations are gradually accumulated which seem to cast doubt upon existing theory. While new tests are being planned, new formulations of theory are developed which might fit these new facts.

The relation between fact and theory may be expressed in syllogistic terms. A theory predicts that certain facts will be observable – ‘If X conditions exist, then Y is observable; if Y is not observable, then X condition does not obtain.’

However, if X condition does exist, and Y is not observable, then the original proposition is denied. However, such a syllogistic pattern of logic does not guarantee that the original theory is correct when the facts are predicted and conformity merely guarantees that certain other theoretical propositions are not correct.

c. Facts redefine and classify theory:

New facts that fit the theory will always redefine theory, for they state in detail what the theory states in very general terms. Facts clarify that theory throws further light upon its concepts. Finally, they may actually present new theoretical problems, that is, the redefinition may be far more specific than the theory.

An example is the general hypothesis that when individuals from a rural population, particularly the tribal, enter the urban environment they experience a considerable amount of personal disorganisation. This process has been studied in most detail for immigrant groups and for children of such immigrants. It is normally held that many changes in habit pattern will occur in this adjustment process.

One of these is a decline in fertility. As a consequence of these notions, we could predict that when the rural, particularly tribal, people settle in the urban areas and large cities their birth rate will drop. Actually, the net reproduction rate of urban tribal people is much lower than that of the rural tribal people and the fact is, therefore, in accordance with the theoretical prediction.

The theory, however, is a general expectation, while the demographic facts are specific. The theory does not state how much the difference will be. In actuality, the fertility of urban tribal people is even lower than that of the non-tribal urban people. We are thus left with a redefinition of the theory towards greater specificity, and the older theory simply does not account for these new facts.

The facts do not reject the older theory – they are simply more complex and definite than the prediction of the original theory, and they call for further research. Indeed, it is one of the major experiences of research that actually testing any existing theory is likely to redefine it. The concepts that have been accepted as simple and obvious turn out to be elusive, vague, and ill- defined when we fit them to the facts.

It is not that the facts do not fit. It is rather that they are much richer, more precise and definite than concept or theory. Further, many such redefinitions and classifications may in turn lead to the discovery of new hypotheses. For so long as our theories use general terms and makes rough predictions, it is difficult to disprove them.

However, facts become a stimulus to the redefinition and classification of theory even when they are in conformity with it. This process leads, in turn, to reformulation of theory and the discovery of new facts.

The growth of science is seen in new facts and new theory. Facts take their ultimate meaning from the theories which summarise them, classify them, predict them, point them out, and define them. However, theory may direct the scientific process; facts in turn play a significant role in the development of theory. New and anomalous facts may initiate new theories.

New observations lead to the rejection and reformulation of existing theory, or may demand that older theories be redefined. Concepts which appeared definite in meaning are clarified by the specific facts relating to them. The geographer must accept the responsibilities of the scientist, who must see fact in theory and theory in fact.

2. Law:

The second key element in scientific thinking is ‘law’. ‘Any fully developed scientific theory contains, embedded within it, certain statements about unvarying relationships. These laws may be evident at the level of everyday experience or only at the level of scientific investigation, for example, by controlled experiment or microscopic investigation. As with theories there is a predisposition among scientists to seek laws which cover broad categories of phenomena…There is also a preference within science for deterministic laws – that ‘wherever’ A and B are present C ‘will’ result. But it is recognized that some laws have a probabilistic form even if they represent a transient stage in the development of the discipline and will give way to deterministic laws as the discipline develops’.

The credit to put the relevance of ‘law’ in geography goes to Schaefer who said that geographers should seek to make law-like statements. ‘A science’, according to him, ‘is characterized by its explanations, and explanations require laws…. To explain the phenomena, one has described means always to recognize them as instances of laws…. In geography… the major regularities which are described refer to spatial patterns…. Hence geography has to be conceived as the science concerned with the formulation of the laws governing the spatial distribution of certain features on the surface of the Earth’.

Geographical procedures would then not differ from those employed in the other sciences, both natural and social – observation would lead to a hypothesis—about the interrelationship between two spatial patterns, for example, and this would be tested against large number of cases, to provide the material for a law if it were thereby verified.

A law should be unrestricted in its application over space and time. It is thus a ‘universal statement’ of unrestricted range. This suggests at least one important criterion for distinguishing a law.

‘The universality criterion requires that laws should not make specific or tacit reference to proper names. Consider the proposition that towns of similar size and function are found at similar distances apart. The term ‘town’ can be defined only with reference to human social organization and it carries with it … an implicit reference to the proper name ‘Earth’. Within such a context the statement may be true, but the universality criterion has undoubtedly been offended. To get round this difficulty, we may attempt to define ‘town’ in terms of a set of properties which we claim are possessed by towns and only towns. In an infinite universe, however, there may well be some phenomenon which possesses all the properties listed without being a town. Again, we are not justified in regarding the statement being a proper law’.

However, strict laws are only found in physics, and to an extent in chemistry. These are truly universal in nature. It makes the development of laws in biology, zoology, geology, physical geography, etc. redundant, except in so far as such disciplines can reduce their statements to those of physics. The social sciences and human geography are even more seriously affected.

Harvey (1969) contradicts interpreting universality in such a strict manner, as does Smart (1959). To quote Harvey (1969), ‘There are two ways in which we may justify some relaxation of it. With purely empirical proposition it may prove useful to draw a distinction between philosophical and methodological universality. Philosophical universality involves the belief that universally true statements can be made. Such a belief may be supported by reference to some set of metaphysical propositions … or else it depends upon showing that a statement is in fact universally true. The latter course is essentially an inductive step and, therefore, a degree of uncertainty is involved. A proposition can never be shown empirically to be universally true. This applies as much to the strict laws of physics as it does to the ‘mere generalizations’ of biology and economics. Philosophical universality implies methodological universality, but the reverse relationship does not hold. We may regard statements as if they were universally true without necessarily believing that they are or even assuming that they will ultimately be shown to be so…..In such a case it becomes a matter of deciding whether it is useful and reasonable to regard a statement as if it were universally true, and hence, law-like.’

A substantial part of Braithwaite’s analysis of scientific explanation is concerned with establishing how laws are related to a surrounding structure of theory. It is impossible to determine whether a statement is or is not a law simply by referring to the truth or falsity of the generalisation it contains.

A major criterion in determining whether a statement is or is not a law is the relationship of that statement to the system of statements that constitutes a theory. If this criterion is accepted, then the ideas are required to be adjusted regarding the verification procedures necessary to transform a scientific hypothesis into a scientific law.

A generalisation may be set up or established as true or false simply by direct reference to empirical subject matter. The truth of an empirical law has to be established by this method too, but in addition, it requires support from other empirical laws, theoretical laws (that cannot be given any direct test), and also from other lower level empirical laws that helps it to predict.

A key concept in this respect is that laws must be proven through objective procedures and not accepted simply because they seem plausible. As Bunge (1962) puts it, ‘The plausibility or intuitive reality of a theory is not a valid basis for judging a theory. A valid law must predict certain patterns in the world, so that having developed an idea about those patterns, the researcher must formulate them into a testable hypothesis—”a proposition whose truth or falsity is capable of being asserted”. An experiment is then designed to test the hypothesis, data are collected, and the validity of the prediction evaluated….One successful test will not turn it into a law replication on other data sets will be needed since a law is supposed to be universal’.

After sufficient (undefined) successful tests, therefore, a hypothesis may be accorded law-like status and is fed into a body of theory which comprises a series of related laws. There are two types of statements within a full theory, ‘the axioms or givens’, which are statements taken to be true, such as laws; and the deductions, or ‘theorems’ from those initial conditions, which are derived consequences from agreed facts—the next round of hypotheses.

However, Jones (1956) pointed out the impossibility of discovering universal laws about human behaviour and indicated the existence of two types of law in physics – the ‘determinate’ laws of classic physics, which apply microscopically; and the ‘probabilistic quantum laws’ which refer to the behaviour of individual particles.

Golledge and Amedeo (1968) attempted to indicate that science recognises several types of law, and also that the veracity of a law-like statement can never be finally proven, since it cannot be tested against all instances, at all times and in all places.

They indicated four types of laws which have relevance for human geographer:

(1) Cross-sectional laws, which describe functional relationships, but show no causal connection, although they may suggest one;

(2) Equilibrium laws which state what will be observed if certain criteria are met;

(3) Dynamic laws, which incorporate notions of change, with the alteration in one variable being followed by (perhaps causing) an alteration in another. Dynamic laws may be historical, showing that B preceded by A and followed by C, or developmental, in which B would be followed by C, D, E, etc.; and

(4) ‘Statistical laws’ which are probability statements of B happening given that A exists. All laws of the other three categories may be either deterministic or statistical with the latter almost certainly the case with phenomena studied by geographers.

However, according to Sack (1972), space, time and matter cannot be separated analytically in an empirical science which is concerned to provide explanation. He attempted to show that geometry is not an acceptable language for such a science, i.e. geography.

Nevertheless, geography is closely allied with geometry in its emphasis on the spatial aspects of events (the instances of law), but geometry alone is insufficient as a basis for explanation and prediction since no processes are involved in the derivation of geometries.

Bunge (1973), however, responded to this statement, claiming that spatial prediction was quite possible with reference to the geometry alone, as instanced by central place theory and Thunian analysis.

Sack (1973) responded by saying that the static laws espoused by Bunge are only special cases of dynamic laws having antecedent and consequent conditions and that although the laws of geometry are unequivocally static, purely spatial, non-deducible from dynamic laws, and explain and predict physical geometric properties of events, they do not answer the questions about the geometric properties of events that geographers raise and they do not make statements about process’.

Geography, according to Sack, is concerned to explain events and it requires substantive laws – such laws may contain geometric terms, such as ‘the frictions of crossing a certain substance’, but these terms of themselves are insufficient to provide explanations.

He identified two types of laws relevant to geographical work:

(1) Congruent substance laws which are independent of location – statements of ‘if A then B’ are universals which require no spatial referent;

(2) Overlapping substance laws which involve spatial terms – ‘if A then B’ in such cases contains some specific reference to location.

Both types are relevant and necessary in providing the answers to the geographical questions, so case may be made for a necessary ‘spatialness’ to the substance laws of human geography.

Thus, positivist-led geography has wider application of laws for successful and fruitful analysis of geographical phenomena together with spatial patterns. The concept of law has a much wider significance in such geography which is being conceived of as a science with law-seeking episteme because it postulates a three-fold hierarchy of scientific statements from factual statements or systematised descriptions through a middle-tier of ’empirical generalisations or laws’, to general or theoretical laws.

3. Logic:

But laws are not only type of connecting statements used in scientific theory, indeed a theory which consists entirely of laws based on experience and experiment is viewed with disfavour; it is seen as more satisfactory if most of the laws and other links in the theory can be shown to be logically derived from a much smaller number of fundamental assumptions and laws. Scientists have tended to use mathematics (algebra and geometry) as the language for expressing and developing this logic, but other abstract languages are also used (for example, chemical equations and bonding diagram).

Logical validation is one of the most commonly used methods of validation and certainly one of the most difficult to apply. It refers to either theoretical or ‘common-sense’ analysis which concludes simply that the items being what they are, the nature of the continuum cannot be other than stated to be. Logical validation, or ‘face validity’ as it is sometimes called, is always used because it automatically springs from the careful definition of the continuum and the selection of the items.

4. Reductionism:

It is the final key in much scientific thought—the idea that the laws and theories of a discipline can be re- expressed as special case of the outworking of the laws of a more fundamental discipline. Reductionism is usually taken to apply to any doctrine that seeks to explain a higher-order phenomenon in terms of a lower-order phenomenon.

Such a doctrine can be held in various forms, and applied in many different areas of intellectual endeavour. One form of reductionism is the notion that laws of all other sciences can be in principle reduced to, or expressed in terms of, the laws of micro physics; another is the thesis that all mental faculties can be expressed as events in or states of the brain.

Reductionism is defined more formally as concepts or statements redefined in terms which are more elementary or basic. In many cases, the communication of knowledge thus raised cannot be expressed in ordinary verbal language, and two other methods must be added. The first is that of the use of words with specialised meanings, and the second is the language of pure symbols associated with mathematics and symbolic logic.

A geographical explanation may be said to be reductionist if it attempts to account for a range of phenomena in terms of a single determining factor. In human geography, the most common form of reductionism is probably that which asserts that all terms which refer to groups or collectivities can be, in principle, expressed as descriptions of the behaviour of individual actor.

This view, however, has come to be known as methodological individualism. Some Marxist theories are said to be reductionist because they attempt to explain the diversity of sound behaviour by reference simply to the economy.

‘Studies in physical geography have, in general, no option but to be carried out using the methods of contemporary science, whether these are reductionist or attempts at holism-like system analysis. We seek an understanding of landslides or glacial motion in terms of mechanical principles, and apply chemistry in the study of weathering processes and soil formation. The behavior of larger, more complex systems is routinely analysed with elaborate computer models, as in drainage basin hydrology or weather forecasting. But, at this point we ought to ask whether at the next level of complexity, that of human societies together with their environment, both living and non­living, reductionist approaches are appropriate or applicable, and with what degree of success…. Should geography try to be like physics? Should it be possible to express everything in laws … which are 100 percent applicable in the sense of temporal prediction (… the laws of physics do not exhibit 100 percent probability but they are not far short for practical purpose)….The techniques of the mathematician and statistician have been paramount, for example, in the elaboration of models of spatial interaction, the use of idea from catastrophe theory and Q-analysis, and the widespread employment of bivariate and multivariate linear models for the analysis of data’.

To quote Hagget and Chorley (1967), ‘… those subjects which have modelled their forms on mathematics or physics … have climbed considerably more rapidly than those which have attempted to build internal or idiographic structure’.

There have been remarkable developments and advances in the development and adaptation of modelling and analytical techniques, but whether empirical studies which have used these have provided any more generalisations and accurate predictions than in non-reductionist approaches is arguable. The great emphasis on space as the central element in geography makes the discipline more like physics.

People unsympathetic to quantification, for its association with ‘hard data’, have often criticised the view for its apparent lack of humanity; its cold objectivity (if it should exist) does not appeal to all. However, reductionism of a different variety may not be accepted that which views all human patterns in terms of a single-factor explanation such as class struggle at the heart of classical Marxist theory that appears to be too simple to explain the great variety of society-environment relationships which have been observed on the face of the Earth.

It is rather difficult to comment on the success of reductionist methods in geography, given the fact that geography has yet to achieve a great success in terms of laws. Some regularities have been pointed out, such as rank size rules of cities; the spatial patterning of towns as service centres, however, the bulky literature concerning them contains evidence of numerous exceptions and assertions of the culture-bound nature of the findings.

‘Geography appears to have carried forward a more just world, no more and no less than any other divisions of learning with which it shares a reluctance to be committed to single element solutions, especially those of an ideological character’.

However, on reduction, Harvey (1969, 94-95) points out, ‘… The problem of finding adequate empirical definition of theoretical concepts can be solved by the provision of an adequate general theory. The development of powerful basic axiomatic statements will make possible precise definition of the idealizations on which current theory rests.

The procedure may lead to the reduction of the large number of idealizations and concepts in social science to special cases of more axiomatic statements…. Many of the concepts and idealizations used in the natural sciences may be ultimately defined by reference to the basic concepts of physics.

The unification of disparate theoretical structures into one system of statements involves the reduction of disparate idealizations to special cases of a few basic postulates. This phenomenon of reduction may also be found in the social sciences, and the development of general theory in the social sciences may well depend on such reduction.

The postulates of economics may be reducible to a particular subset of postulates in psychology…. The degree to which reduction can take place, however, is a controversial issue, and even if it is conceded that total reduction is ultimately possible, this is far from being practicable at the present time. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there is considerable benefit to be had from the integration of diverse concepts and statements into some more general theoretical framework…. The development of general theory in the social sciences—and the reduction of some concepts which this implies— may enable more precise definition of certain idealizations and hence facilitate the statement of an appropriate text for some of the theories developed in the social sciences.’

5. Hypothesis:

Theory, law, logic and reduction—these four elements are the key parts of scientific thinking, but there is however a fifth element—the research hypothesis—which provides a link to the area of scientific practice. In a well-developed natural science, a research hypothesis predicts the outcome of an experiment or observation if the theory is correct. In this way, a theory or its extensions can be tested in contexts other than those for which it was originally devised.

The formulation of deduction constitutes a hypothesis; if verified, it becomes a part of a future theoretical construction. In practice, a theory is an elaborate hypothesis which deals with more types of facts than does the simple hypothesis.

A theory states a logical relationship between facts. From this theory, other propositions can be deduced that should be true if the first holds. These deduced propositions are hypotheses. Hypotheses do not necessarily have to be true, however.

The truth of many hypotheses, the researchers formulate is most often unknown. Hypotheses, therefore, are tentative statements about things that the researcher wishes to support or refute. A hypothesis is a provisional statement that guides empirical work in several scientific epistemologies.

A hypothesis, therefore, is a structured speculation that must be tested empirically. If it proves to be valid, then a positive addition is made to the stock of theory; knowledge has been increased. It proves invalid; knowledge has also been increased, albeit in a negative sense.

Routes to Scientific Explanation: Induction and Deduction:

There are two alternative routes to explanation, or which are followed in establishing a scientific law, according to Harvey (1969). The first by ‘induction’—proceeding from numerous particular instances to universal statements—and the second that of ‘deduction’—proceeding from some a priori universal premises to statements about particular sets of events.

i. Route (1):

It is also known as the Baconian Route or ‘Inductive Route to Scientific Explanation. According to Harvey (1969), ‘Sense-perception data provide us with the lowest level information for fashioning scientific understanding. This information, when transformed into some language, forms a mass of poorly ordered statements which we sometimes refer to as ‘factual’.

It is partly ordered by the use of words and symbols to describe it. Then, by the process of definition, measurement, and classification, we may place such partially ordered facts into groups and categories and therefore impose some degree of seemingly rational order upon the data.

In the early stages of scientific development, such ordering and classification of data may be the main activity of science, and the classification so developed may have a weak explanatory function…..The status of empirical laws established by such a route is a matter of some controversy.

It should be noted that each step along this route so far involves inductive inference. Thus laws established by this route are alone sometimes called inductive laws. Some maintain that inductive laws cannot be accorded the status of scientific law.’

This route to scientific explanation, however, does not describe how the scientist should proceed, but it does describe one of the ways in which a scientist might describe his/her action so as to meet with the approval of other scientists.

This route involves a dangerous form of generalising from the particular case, as the acceptance of the interpretations depends too much on the charisma of the scholar involved. Churchman (1961) observed that ‘facts, measurements and theories are methodologically the same’. Applying an a priori classification system to a set of data may thus be regarded as an activity similar in kind to postulating an a priori theory.

ii. Route (2):

‘The second route whereby we may justify scientific conclusions clearly recognises the a priori nature of much scientific knowledge. It firmly rests upon intuitive speculation regarding the nature of the reality we seek to know…. This involves some kind of intuitive picturing of how that reality is structured. Such a priori pictures … later identify as a priori models. With the aid of such pictures we may postulate a theory. That theory should have a logical structure which ensures consistency and a set of statements which connect the abstract notions contained in the theory to sense-perception data. The theory will enable us to deduce sets of hypotheses which, when given an empirical interpretation, may be tested against sense- perception data. The more hypotheses we can check in this fashion, the more confident we may feel in the validity of the theory provided, of course, that the tests prove positive.’

‘In the process of elaborating or seeking to test a theory, we may resort to another kind of model— an a posteriori model—which expresses the notion contained in the theory in a different form says, in mathematical notation. In some circumstances, model building may here amount to developing an experimental design procedure, and a primary function of this procedure is to lay down the rules whereby we may define, classify, and measure the variables which are relevant for testing the theory. By using such experimental designs we may amass evidence to confirm the hypotheses contained in the theory’.

In the nutshell, this route begins with an observer perceiving patterns in the world; he/she then formulates experiments, or some other kind of test, to prove the veracity of the explanations which he/she produced for those patterns. Only when his/her ideas have been tested successfully against data other than from which they are derived can a generalisation be produced.

Scientific knowledge, obtained via the second route, is ‘a kind of controlled speculation. The control really amounts to ensuring that statements are logically consistent and insisting that at least some of the statements may be successfully related to sense-perception data’. It is such a procedure that an increasing number of human geographers sought to apply during the 1950s and 1960s.

The method, known as positivism, was developed by a group of philosophers working in Vienna during the 1920s and 1930s. It based on a conception of an objective world in which there is order waiting to be discovered. Because that order—the spatial patterns of variation and covariation in the case of geography—exists, it cannot be contaminated by the observer.

A neutral observer, on the basis of his observations or his reading of the research of others, will derive a hypothesis (a speculative law) about some aspect of reality and then test that hypothesis verification of his hypothesis is translates the speculative law into an accepted one.

Deduction occurs when facts are gathered to confirm or disapprove hypothesised relationships among variables that have been deduced from propositions. Whether there were facts that precipitated the propositions does not really matter. What matters is that research is essentially a hypothesis-testing venture in which the hypotheses rest on logically (if not factually) deduced relational statements.

Burgess and Akers (1966) have attempted to reveal how particular hypothesis can be generated from many general and inclusive assertions. Deduction is a type of reasoning in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the given premises, but it does not increase content, although one may require intellectual abilities of a higher order in order to trace all the steps that lead from the premises of a deductive argument to its conclusions.

Most writers on the scientific explanation have argued that the appropriate logic is that of deduction. Thus, the view that scientific explanation must always be reduced in the form of logical deduction has had wide acceptance. Braithwate (1960) has also sought for the systematic organisation of scientific knowledge as a ‘hypothetic-deductive’ system.

He pointed out – ‘A scientific system consists of a set of hypotheses which form’ a deductive system, that is, which is arranged in such a way that from some of the hypotheses as premises all other hypotheses logically follow.

The proposition in a deductive system may be considered as being arranged in an order of levels, the hypotheses at the highest level being those which occur as premises in the system, and those at the lowest level being those which occur as conclusions of the system, and those at intermediate levels being those which occur as conclusions of deductions from higher level hypotheses and which serve as premises for deductions to lower level hypotheses.

With regard to the advantage of deduction, Harvey (1969) suggests that – ‘… if the premises are true then the conclusions are necessarily true. If … we have certain degree of confidence in a set of premises we may possess the same level of confidence with respect to any logically deduced consequence. This property has led to the use of reduction wherever possible. Theories are thus invariably stated as deductive systems of statement… The application of such theories to the actual explanation of events is rendered as logical deduction.’

The form of explanation, which Hempel calls ‘deductive homological’ (covering law explanation) consists of:

i. One or more laws of nature, and

ii. A list of specific initial conditions or circumstances which, when taken together, show that an event must necessarily have occurred or that describe the setting of the event to be explained.

From these premises, the occurrence of the event in question can be inferred by a strictly deductive chain of reasoning. In this form of explanation, prediction and explanation are symmetrical and deduction ensures the logical certainty of the conclusion.

It is assumed that the final outcome of this process will be the discovery and verification of a set of natural laws from which all events can be rigorously deduced. When that point is reached, science will have achieved its ultimate goals.

Induction involves moving from particular instances of relations among variables to the formulation of hypotheses and from these to the development of propositions. Many scientists had claimed or appeared to have claimed that laws and theories were derived from the observation of repeated regularities. This method is often referred to as induction. In one or another of its forms, induction is the way most social scientists go about business of expanding knowledge.

Theodorsen and Theodorsen (1969) have attempted to distinguish between two basic types of induction—enumerative and analytic. Enumerative induction is the most common form of induction used in social science research today.

Most often enumerative induction involves generalisation from samples with varying degrees of representativeness. Usually, but not invariably, these generalisations are derived through the application of statistical procedures to the data.

Accompanying these studies are usually statements pertaining to ‘probability’ of generalisations to larger and more inclusive populations based on findings from the sample methods. Analytic induction is a procedure whereby there is a case-by-case analysis of specific features to determine which conditions are always present prior to the occurrence of certain types of conduct.

Induction is important to our concern with scientific method because of the role it plays in the formulation of empirical generalisations.

These generalisations may conveniently be divided into:

i. Summative, and

ii. Extended.

A summative generalisation describes a property which has been confirmed by the actual observation of all the relevant cases, for example, the statement, ‘All the men in this room are old’. Since the men in question have actually been examined, the generalisation does not go beyond the evidence and therefore does not involve inductive reasoning.

However, the statement, ‘All swans are white’ is an example of an extended empirical generalisation— as one goes beyond the evidence on which it is based.

We may have examined thousands upon thousands of swans and found them all to be white, yet we cannot guarantee the truth of the general statement because it remains possible that a non-white swan may someday be found (as in fact did happen with the discovery of black swans in Australia).

In fact, we cannot guarantee the truth of an empirical generalisation unless, as in the summative case, we can point to all the singular instances upon which it is based. ‘There is no logical justification for extending belief in the premises to belief in the conclusions. The failure of logicians and philosophers to find (or agree upon) such logical justification has led many to reject its use entirely in the presentation of scientific knowledge’.

Let us consider the role that the inductive reasoning plays in the fallibilist conception of the quest for knowledge. The philosophy of fallibilism tends to reject the traditional positivist view that science begins with the collection of observational data and proceeds inductively to the establishment of general laws. The starting point of the fallibilist conception lies in the realisation that there is an asymmetrical relationship between logical states of a general law and that of its negation.

It is increasingly believed by the fallibilist that a general law is never conclusively verifiable but always conclusively falsifiable. Falsification is possible but verification is not. To be scientific is to recognise explicitly that knowledge is approached by means of a process of conjectures and refutations.

Induction is involved in the development of conjectures (theories, hypotheses), but not in the search for refutation. Induction is also involved in theory-building by virtue of the fact that theories incorporate (often implicitly) laws or law-like statements that extend beyond the evidence upon which they are based. For the fallibilist, however, law-like statements and the theories in which they become embedded are not hard core of science; they are never anything more than heuristic speculations.

The distinguishing feature of the scientific attitude is the willingness—indeed, the desire—to confront these speculations with pertinent empirical observations, thereby exposing them to the possibility of refutations. A refutation, when it occurs, is a logically conclusive result in which inductive reasoning plays no part.

For the fallibilist, therefore, a scientific enquiry has two distinct phases—’an imaginative, hypothetical, theory-proposing phase’ and ‘a critical, objective, experimental phase’. Inductive inferences may be involved in the former, but they are strictly banned from the latter.

In the traditional positivist view of science, general laws established by inductive reasoning are not regarded as speculations but as Verified scientific knowledge’. For the positivist, induction is the very foundation of science. For the fallibilist, induction leads only to conjectures, and science does not begin in earnest until these conjectures are confronted by the threat of falsification.

Although the distinction between deduction and induction serves the important purpose of identifying opposite ways to go about theory- building, most investigators find that their scientific work entails a certain amount of both. Induction probably permits more of an opportunity to see theory in a dynamic state of emergence rather than as already given, as is the case with deduction, but the issue is open to some debate.

Because there is neither a rigorously developed comprehensive theory from which to deduce particular relationships for testing, nor a sufficient accumulation of data to allow for systematic theory development through induction, even personal preferences for one or the other approach must remain flexible and adaptable.

‘The methodological rejection of induction can only apply to certain aspects of the formulation of scientific knowledge. Science attempts to organize the propositions within a deductive frame of inference…. The deductive form of scientific theories must be regarded as the end-product of scientific knowledge, rather than as the mould into which all scientific thought is cast from the very initiation of an investigation.

But even assuming that a deductive theoretical structure has been successfully evolved, induction still plays an important function at certain stages in the articulation and verification of such a theoretical structure…. However, it is misleading to regard deduction and induction as mutually exclusive forms of inference.

Although it is generally agreed that scientific knowledge should be organised as a hypothetico-deductive system and that the law contained in that system can best be applied by a deductive explanatory procedure, there are many occasions when inductive steps may be used within these deductive frameworks.

However, the method of induction was criticised on two grounds. First, it was evident that in many cases the observations were themselves made with pre-conceptions (right or wrong) as to what constituted characteristics worthy of observation and recording.

Second, the exact form of the law-like statement derived was seldom free from theoretical presuppositions and a priori definitions. It seemed that pure induction seldom occurred. It was recognised that the logical justification of induction itself relied upon the inductive method.

These conclusions are important not only for an inductivist theory of scientific method, but for any other empiricist school of thought which believes that facts should and can be allowed to speak for themselves. As mentioned earlier, Popper (1959) introduced falsification as a concept to replace verification, and under this new concept all theories were deemed to be provisional—coherent systems of not yet falsified hypotheses about the nature of phenomena.

The falsificationist position had two other implications:

i. It required that all scientific statements should have the logical possibility of being proved false in this case the claim that ‘All swans are white’ is incapable of being proved conclusively true (the next swan observed might be black), but could be proved false (by the observation of one truly black swan);

ii. the form of empirical enquiries – no longer was it necessary to find evidence in support of a hypothesis, it became part of the scientific enterprise to find evidence which disapproved it. However, a complex and well- tested theory predicts an effect that fails to happen, but this failure may be due to a fundamental falsity of the theory or to some low level error of logic in deriving the research hypothesis. The falsification of the hypothesis requires a search for the false step, not the immediate abandonment of the theory as a whole.

The normal scientific methods have been subjected to critical analysis and criticism, especially on the issues of reductionism and objectivity. Reductionism has been defined earlier as the idea that the laws and theories of one discipline can, and should, be reformulated as special cases of the outworking of a more fundamental discipline, often linked to a change of scale of enquiry. But such a reduction appears to be fallacious.

With regard to the fallacy in the objectivity of scientific knowledge, it is sometimes asserted and assumed that whereas the humanities have important areas which are matters of personal subjective value judgement, science is independent of such personal judgement, an independence assumed by its use of abstract logic and natural measurements.

But this view is difficult to maintain when it is recognised that the type of questions investigated, the theory used and the observations conducted all depend on the research paradigm adopted, and the paradigm in turn reflects the value system of the society and its philosophical and scientific presuppositions.

If objectivity does exist, it is not the objectivity of the individual scientist, but a relative objectivity of the knowledge itself because it has been tested and corrected by many individuals working in different contexts and dimensions.

Relevance of Scientific Method in Geography:

Despite criticisms with regard to the application of scientific method to geography as a way of obtaining useful and reliable knowledge; scientific methods hold relevance in geographical scholarship, research and training in both physical and human geography for three reasons.

1. Although scientism is a mistaken and dangerous ideology, the scientific method does have the ability to provide coherent and testable theories about the nature of geographical phenomena.

2. The scientific method remains appealing because it is in many respects a codified and logically corrected extension of thought structures developed in everyday life, including the willingness to correct theories or hypotheses in the light of experience.

3. Partly as a consequence of these two points, knowledge of a scientific type is required by society for its purpose of managing social and natural systems (and if geography fails to provide such knowledge; some other disciplines will develop to fill the gaps).

However, the scientific geography cannot remain untouched by critical evaluations and criticisms, and the elements which were required to be retained had to be modified. As a result, many geographical theories were ‘derivative’ in the sense that they attempted to specify the application of geographical theories which were established in cognate disciplines (in the physical and social sciences). The ability or inability of derivative theories to provide the basis for geographical explanations largely depended on the test of their overall value as research programmes.

But, in addition to such derivative theories, there emerged a need for specifically geographical theories or laws which were essentially laws of composition, specifying the way in which these derivative laws appeared to have interacted to produce the multi- faceted phenomena that geographers sought to understand. The level at which these laws of composition operated, however, appeared to be much greater than the scale at which the derivative laws and theories operated.

It is possible to identify a number of examples of derivative theory already used in geography. Economic concepts have frequently been used as the foundation for geographic theory. Economics has, perhaps, been the most successful of the social sciences in developing formal theory (even if the empirical status of the theory is open to doubt). The central-place theory has frequently been described as the one relatively well-developed branch of theoretical economic geography.

Central-place theory provides just one example out of many to demonstrate how geographical theory may be derived from the basic postulates of economics. The existence of such postulates was undoubtedly an important necessary condition for the emergence of a theoretical human geography.

Many of the postulates and theorems of economics have been absorbed into geographical theory. In particular, the whole of location theory, which has been ‘especially’ concerned with the development of the theoretical-deductive method in geography. Human geographers have long recognised that geographic patterns are the end- product of a large number of individual decisions made at different times for often very different reasons, and that it was necessary to employ some psychological notions in explaining those patterns which revealed that psychological and sociological postulates were introduced in the construction of geographical theory.

Similarly, the geographical studies of weathering had applied the chemistry of ions and cations to the specific chemical composition of parent rocks under stated conditions of temperature and humidity. The examples suggest that although some geographical problems required ‘spatial laws’, not all derived theory in geography would be concerned with spatial relationships.

It seemed rather less easy to identify) laws of composition in current geographical work, but some recent applications of choice theory to the choice of destination and mode of travel brought together economic and non-economic variables in a choice calculus that seemed more convincing than explanation in economic terms alone.

The use of derivative and geographical theories and laws necessarily implied an openness to reductionism—a willingness to accept reduction, but not an assumption that all geographical problems could and must be solved in reductionist terms.

It also implied an open approach to the ‘types of logic’ adopted. However, many of the cognate disciplines (physics, chemistry, economics) themselves appeared to depend on ‘abstract logic’, and that abstract languages have proved extremely powerful and made it likely that such languages would be used in geography.

Alan Wilson (1974) attempted to show how an abstract mathematical language was capable of integrating quite different parts of urban and regional systems. But the openness to abstract logic (like mathematics) must not be allowed to exclude from geographic theory those variables and concepts (e.g. the quality of landscape) which were not capable of representation. Geography, however, should remain open to the introduction of new languages that might prove more flexible.

The advocates of the application of scientific method to geography feel that at the level of practice, geography would need to retain most of its elements so as to prove the ‘scientific status’ of the discipline (e.g. geography).

The research hypothesis, the hypothesis test and prediction as testing device would be required. But the idea that any one set of observations conclusively proved or definitively falsified a theory could not be retained. It was the accumulation of such results (positive or negative) that led to the advance or decline of rival research programmes.

However, it seems inescapable that scientific geography, in spite of being subjected to criticism, will require the retention, development and refinement of measuring devices, guided by the emergent geographical theories and by the cognate disciplines from which they have been derived, in the future with openness as to what levels and forms of measurement are the most appropriate for a given study. There will be a continuing need for statistical analysis to carry on the application of scientific method to geographical study, research and training.

In spite of a strong assertion for the relevance of scientific method in geography, the admirers and/or adherents of the method also accept the possibility of the relevance of humanistic or phenomenological approaches in geographical explanation that may yield new insights into the nature of geographical phenomena. Many geographers strongly believe in the desirability of methodological heterodoxy, e.g. allowing the co-existence of radically different approaches within the discipline.

Nevertheless, without scientific method in the subject, ‘geography would cease to offer a convincing interpretation of the Earth’s surface and the activities of individuals upon it’. There is no doubt that application of scientific method to geography has given a nomothetic basis to the discipline with a scientific status and saved it from the crisis of its identity that it suffered during the transition period.

Geographical Application of Scientific Method: Some Problems:

The post-War geography in the mid-twentieth century witnessed continuing debate with regard to the application of scientific method in geography. There were two mutually exclusive arguments on this issue. One side argued that scientific method should be introduced into both physical and human geography.

On the other hand, some geographers had claimed that the discipline was in some sense an exceptional discipline which might be excused (if not completely excluded) from the constraints of scientific method. The debate, however, had its origin in the nineteenth century and over decades; it hardened to a great extent.

Despite the counter-arguments and dichotomies, the period from 1960 experienced a vigorous expansion of geographical research using quasi-scientific methods, with emphasis on the law- seeking approaches and model-based paradigms.

The philosophical and methodological base for this was carried forward by many young geographers of the Anglo-American heritage and tradition. A number of textbooks in both human and physical geography emphasised the need for theory, laws, hypotheses, measurement and statistical testing.

But the enthusiastic practitioners and protagonists of this approach were often unaware of the problems inherent in the scientific approach, and could not identify the additional problems posed by its geographical use. Most of these problems stemmed from the twin facts that ‘geography as a whole deals with multi-variable open systems and that human geography deals with knowing subjects’.

1. Geographers were, over many years, concerned with the term ‘uniqueness’ because geographical phenomena on the surface of the Earth are unique and distinguishable, as well as complex in character and causation. The conclusion drawn is that geography deals with unique events, and generalisation in the form of laws and theories is doomed to failure or cannot be carried forth.

It is the idiographic attitude that implies a concern with the uniqueness of individual phenomena or events whereas the nomothetic approach implies a desire to subsume individual cases under laws or law-like statements of very general, if not universal, applicability.

This position, however, certainly provided a powerful argument against inductive methods in geography, and many geographers who stated for the uniqueness case, nevertheless argued for an inductive approach. It was then less clear that uniqueness was a valid objection to a theoretically based hypothesis-testing approach, because a collection of unique cases might nevertheless confirm or reject a hypothesised relationship, uniqueness was only an obstacle to that if it could be shown that causal relationships were themselves unique to each instance and changed inconsistently from place to place, and from time to time (spatial- temporal).

It was, however, argued that uniqueness with respect to some trivial property (location of some geographical phenomenon may be a trivial property) or some peripheral relationship was insufficient reason to invalidate scientific method.

2. A second consequence of geographical systems being large open systems is the difficulty of carrying out experimental tests. The sheer large size of a geographical system (the atmosphere, the river basin, a city) makes the laboratory experiment impossible. Scaling down the system may change and/or alter its properties in unknown ways.

Even if the system is reproduced in the laboratory there is no assurance that all the variables relevant in reality have been included in the laboratory version. An alternative solution to it in scientific terms is the ‘field experiment’, but it is difficult to ensure that the only variables allowed to vary are those being investigated, and certain experiments in human -geography would be politically or morally unacceptable.

So in field experiments and certainly in field data collection much of the control of extraneous variables is achieved by purely statistical means which in theory allow the isolation of a two- variable relationship when ‘all other variables are held constant’. Yet even such methods can only ‘hold constant’ recorded variables. There is no way of controlling for the possible effects of unrecognized and unrecorded additional variables.

3. A third consequence of the multi-variable nature of geographic system concerns the use of theory from other discipline. This may be applied and synthetic (the attempt to borrow theory from other disciplines to bear on a geographic problem) or reductionist (the attempt to interpret geographical relationships as special cases of more general theory in other disciplines).

Such attempt to borrow is especially difficult if more than one other discipline is involved, each with a scale of analysis, a conceptual framework and definition which may not be compatible with each other or with the geographical terms of reference.

A common geographical solution to this is to adopt one discipline as the source of a central theoretical framework (an ‘economic approach’ to urban geography, the ‘physics’ of slope development) and to use theory from other disciplines as modifying the central theory.

A problem remains, however, that the best current theory in geography requires some knowledge of many natural and social sciences. It is this, one suspects, that makes most geographers reluctant, if not unable, to pursue a wide slice of the discipline at the highest level.

4. Another problem that arises in applying scientific method in geography is the interference by the observer with the phenomenon observed. This problem is encountered in laboratory sciences, but it is usually possible to so design the experiment as to minimise the effect. It occurs in physical geography.

In human geography, the same problem occurs in two more acute forms:

(a) If the presence of an observer is known to the actors (either in a role of observer or as a simple stranger), it may lead to a short-run change in behaviour, conscious or unconscious; the results of observation will thus be untypical of normal behaviour, and

(b) The interaction between observer and observed (at the time of observation or later by publication of research findings) may produce long-run changes which would not otherwise have occurred. If such changes are towards a research hypothesis, ‘a false hypothesis may be spuriously confirmed, if counter to the hypothesis a correct hypothesis may be mistakenly rejected’.